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Introduction
Endowed with the legal power to authorize whatever foreign policies it deems necessary to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council has become the preeminent organ of the United Nations (UN). It has the legal authority to suspend economic and diplomatic relations between countries, impose blockades, and authorize the use of armed force (see Hurd, 2007; Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Voeten, 2001) . The body includes 15 members: the five ever-present Permanent Members, and the ten Non-Permanent Members (NPMs), who must win election to serve limited two-year terms.
Our study seeks to explain which countries win election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as NPMs. Note that at least four NPMs must vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass, giving these members a central role on the world stage. The President of the Security Council -a position that rotates among the members -has influence over the agenda and the order of voting (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 130-131) . Most importantly, the UNSC votes by open ballot so that the voice of an elected member has a global reach on central matters of world security. Accordingly, some countries appear willing to bribe and reward NPMs. For instance, the United States increases direct foreign aid by more than 50 percent when a country serves on the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) . Also, NPMs become more likely to receive World Bank project loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with relatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al., 2009a (Dreher et al., , 2009b (Dreher et al., , 2010 . Asian NPMs see their loans from the Asian Development Bank rise around 30 percent (Lim and Vreeland, forthcoming) .
Understanding which countries receive these rewards can serve to inform longstanding economic questions over the allocation and effects of foreign aid and IMF/World Bank loans (see, e.g., Easterly, 2001; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010) . Does the UNSC election process direct these funds towards countries with particular characteristics? Kuziemko and Werker, following Malone (2000) , assert that "Service on the Council is by no means random " (2006: 909) . Yet, to our knowledge, no established study presents the systematic determinants of election to the Security Council. The only published study focuses exclusively on the selection of Western European countries to various UN committees (Scharioth, 2010) . Two working papers on the broader selection of members to the UNSC that have been presented at conferences since we first presented the preliminary results of this paper in 2006 include Iwanami (2012) and Schmitz and Schwarze (2012) . In contrast, good qualitative studies on the selection of UNSC members have been published, such as Malone (2000) .
The power to elect the NPMs formally rests in the hands of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which includes delegates from all recognized UN member countries.
Usually, however, the UNGA vote serves as a mere ratification of decisions made by regional caucuses, which play a privileged role in the nomination process. The determinants of UNSC election may therefore differ across regions. Only when there remains disagreement at the regional level does the UNGA vote become meaningful. On these occasions, the interplay of two separate sets of preferences -those at the regional level, and those at the global level (the UNGA) -determine election to the UNSC.
What shapes these preferences? To choose NPMs, the UN Charter calls on government representatives to consider "the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization." In practice, however, matters are more complex. A detailed set of procedural rules and at least two unwritten gentlemen's agreements also shape the UNSC election procedure. Moreover, UN Ambassadors appear to consider factors beyond contributions to peacekeeping: political affiliations, economic strength, and foreign aid may all play a role. To investigate discrete choice settings, scholars often employ the conditional (fixed effects) logit model in which a single decision-maker chooses a single option according to utility maximization (see McFadden, 1973) . The UNSC election process differs from this model in at least two respects. First, as discussed above, up to two different sets of preferences can be in play: the regional and the global. Second, in some election years the UNGA regularly elects two candidates from one region, not a single candidate. We therefore develop a multiple-discrete choice model that extends the conditional logit model to allow, in a simple way, for the separate identification of two intermingling sets of preferences, and for the number of choices from the set of alternatives to vary (from zero to two).
Our empirical analysis of election to the UNSC considers five broad theoretical perspectives:
(i) Does the UNGA follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace, as directed by the UN Charter? (ii) Does the receipt of foreign aid predict UNSC election? (iii) Is election driven by international power or close relationships with powerful countries? (iv) Do cultural traits play a role? (v) Do governments practice a turn-taking norm of sharing seats by rotating through the eligible candidates? The last hypothesis derives from the common misconception that membership on the UNSC "rotates" through the UN membership. Formally, membership does not rotate, but in practice the regional groups and the UNGA might follow such a norm.
Analyzing data on UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005, we find evidence of some commitment to peace from every region and from the UNGA. Each region shows evidence that countries engaged in international war are less likely to receive regional endorsement.
Such countries are also consistently less likely to prevail when seats are contested in the UNGA. We also observe large negative effects for countries engaged in civil war in Asia and Eastern Europe, and there is a positive link between troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and election probability for Asia, Latin America and Western Europe.
As for international power, all regions and the UNGA exhibit some evidence of a preference for populous countries. We find weaker evidence that richer countries, measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita, enjoy an advantage in Asia and Latin America. We find only patchy, and somewhat mixed, evidence that foreign aid determines election.
Culture appears to hold occasional influence within regions. Countries that share a common political ideology with their region are more likely to be elected in some regions, but not in others. There are also mixed effects for countries with a history of colonialism. A British colonial legacy helps in Asia and the GRULAC, while a French colonial legacy may have helped at the UNGA level during the Cold War -since then the French colonial legacy hurts.
Attitudes to corruption are also mixed: it pays in the GRULAC, but not in the WEOG. The UNGA has switched either side of the Cold War from favoring corrupt countries, to shunning them. Aside from the common role of population, involvement in an international conflict, and a norm of taking turns, our results suggest the presence of significant heterogeneity in the determinants of UNSC election across regions. Therefore, while culture and history do not seem to matter for UNSC election within regions, they may nevertheless drive differences across regions.
The data analysis does reveal a "turn-taking" norm in the regional selection process. A country whose turn arrives is more likely to receive regional nomination, which accords with the common "rotation" perception. As seems reasonable, however, the turn-taking rights that influence selection at the regional level do not seem to influence UNGA voting over contested seats.
The results of this study contribute to a number of literatures. First, it relates to the ongoing discussion of UN reform, and reform of the UNSC in particular (Franck, 2003; O'Neill, 1996; Hosli et al., 2011) . This debate centers on the question of representation but strangely lacks a systematic understanding of the current determinants of UNSC membership. Our findings may help to mitigate this difficulty by clarifying whom the election practices advantage. With an understanding that the two main determinants center on a tendency to choose populous countries and to respect an egalitarian norm of turn-taking, we can recast the debate as connected to a central theme in democratic theory: majoritarian principals versus minority rights.
Our analysis also relates to the wider literature on whether the selection of leaders is fair in the sense that it can be explained solely by the quality of the candidates (e.g., Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003; Diamond and Toth, 2007) . Although "quality" is not easily defined in the context of UNSC membership, we include in our analysis certain country characteristics that seem unrelated to quality, such as religion (the proportion of the population that is Muslim) and voting patterns in the UNGA (how often a country votes with the United States/Russia), and thereby provide an implicit test of the "fairness" of the election process. As we find that these factors do not have systematic effects, reformers can focus on the influences that do appear to matter and judge as to whether populous countries deserve to win election more often or if everyone should have a turn -the two patterns that the data analysis does support.
Our study further contributes to the related literature on the selection of political leaders more generally. For instance, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) find that democracies select better educated leaders as compared to autocracies. A link between democracy and UNSC membership might therefore arise if better-educated leaders are better-able to negotiate for UNSC membership. To explore this, we consider whether democracy indeed predicts UNSC membership -we find, however, that it does not.
Finally, we offer a generic econometric model of elections where there is a nomination process at one level and an endorsement vote at another. In our case, the levels are regional and global, and the model has applicability to a wide range of selection processes including the selection of membership in other UN bodies and other international organizations.
Scholars may further employ the model to analyze the selection of leaders within federalist systems or within countries with primary rounds of voting at different district-levels.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the UNSC election process, and Section 3 presents various hypotheses about the determinants of election to the UNSC. In Section 4 we formally develop the econometric model, providing a likelihood equation for UNSC election, and we discuss other details of our methodology. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes with a summary discussion of the implications of our main findings.
The election process
The UNSC election process for NPMs follows certain rules and agreements. (Security Council Report, 2011: 7) . This seat is often called the "Arab swing seat." We control for this institutional arrangement in the empirical analysis.
The UNGA conducts staggered elections for five seats each autumn. Terms begin in January the following year. 5 To be eligible for election as a NPM, a country must, first, belong to one of the five caucusing groups. At present, one UN member (Kiribati) is ineligible on these grounds, and prior to 2000, when it gained temporary membership in the WEOG, so too was Israel (Security Council Report, 2011: 6) . Second, NPMs in the final year of their term cannot run for immediate re-election (UN Charter 23(2)). The Permanent Members of the UNSC -2 Recent contributions in this area with relevance to our approach include Glasgow et al. (forthcoming) and Golder et al. (forthcoming) . 3 Much of the background for this section can also be found on the web site of the Security Council Report, an independent non-profit organization affiliated with Columbia University: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org. We also draw on Luck (2006) . 4 Before 1966, there were only six elected members of the UNSC. Composition was typically: two Latin American countries; one Middle Eastern country; one East European country; and two from the British Commonwealth countries. See Daws (1999) for an account of the development of the UN regional groups. 5 The term of the single Eastern European representative begins in even years. The two representatives of the WEOG group begin their terms in odd years. The terms for the two representatives of the GRULAC are staggered; the UNGA elects one each year. The Asia group's two seats are similarly staggered. The three seats filled by the Africa group are also staggered with two terms beginning in even years and one term beginning in odd years. To win election, a country must receive at least two-thirds of the votes in the UNGA (UN Charter 18(2)). When no candidate meets this threshold, the UNGA holds runoff elections.
On rare occasions, there are many rounds, and no country can garner the required two-thirds majority; compromise candidates have emerged in these instances. In theory, members of the UNGA face no requirement to vote for "Chairman's list" countries, though in practice, they seldom do otherwise (save for isolated protest votes). Therefore, to date, after a Chairman has announced a "clean slate," the UNGA has always ratified the regional selection.
Hypotheses
Who wins election to the UNSC? No published study has addressed the question of UNSC election using quantitative methods. In the next section, we offer the main contribution of our paper: a multiple-discrete choice model to examine the joint determinants of UNSC election at the regional and global levels. First, however, we draw on the broad literature in international relations and on qualitative accounts of UNSC election to develop the testable hypotheses that we apply to our statistical model.
We begin with the UN Charter, which asks members of the UNGA to elect UNSC members on the basis of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. We thus propose to test the impact of the contributions that countries make to UN peacekeeping missions, measured as the log of the number of troops supplied. We also include indicator variables of whether a country is involved in an international military dispute or a civil war.
We further test for an effect of democracy, which is linked to the idea of peace in the sense that it is associated with a commitment to openness and the principles of justice.
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Two further hypotheses reflect ideas coming from the political economy literature. A growing literature shows that countries receive perks from UNSC membership, including US foreign aid (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010) , World Bank projects (Dreher et al., 2009a) , and IMF loans with comparatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al., 2009b (Dreher et al., , 2010 14 A government's connections to powerful countries might also affect its country's election prospects. We measure international connections in four ways. First, we include two variables to capture how frequently each country votes in the UNGA with the United States and USSR/Russia, respectively. Second, we include an indicator for countries with "pariah" status in the eyes of one or more of the major powers, and hence subject to US and/or UN sanctions, as defined by Morgan et al. (2006) . Third, we test whether membership of various political groupings that operate within the UN -the Group of 77 (G77), Non-Aligned 13 IMF programs themselves come in cycles (Conway, 2007) . Omitting participation in IMF programs might thus bias our results in favor of finding a turn-taking norm. A substantial literature argues that IMF and World Bank loans might be given for political-economic reasons rather than need (e.g., Copelovitch, 2009; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kaja and Werker, 2010; Kilby, 2009, forthcoming; Reynaud and Vauday, 2009; Stone, 2002 Stone, , 2004 . As for bilateral foreign aid, we limit our attention to the US role for two reasons: (1) its prominent place -both in quantitative magnitude and in the literature, (2) parsimony. If we include foreign aid from all potential countries, degrees of freedom become low in certain regions. Preliminary analyses of foreign aid patterns from other OECD countries did not reveal any statistically significant correlation with UNSC election. We suggest that more in depth analyses -for example Japan's use of foreign aid to win favor -be explored in country-or region-specific studies. 14 We use estimates of GNI/capita, as opposed to the more common GDP/capita, as it is the measure of income used by the UN in the computation of member state contributions to the General and Peacekeeping budgets. We also follow the UN's methodology in using US$ exchange rate estimates of GNI. These, we argue, are more appropriate than PPP estimates in this context, as what is more relevant is international, rather than domestic, purchasing power. Finally, behavioral norms that have evolved within the decision-making process may also play a role. One such norm, which is widely observed in human evolution, as well as in a wide range of other species, is that of turn-taking (Colman and Browning, 2009; Franz et al., 2011) . In the context of the UNSC election process, the turn-taking norm implies that membership on the UNSC should rotate among the members of each caucusing group. This turn-taking norm relates to the egalitarian norm, which features importantly in the literature on distributive justice (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Deutsch, 1985) , and is consistent with recent models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) .
The Africa group explicitly claims to operate according to the turn-taking norm, but whether some degree of turn-taking occurs among the remaining regions is less clear. To test the possibility that a region practices the turn-taking norm, we construct a variable, "turn-taking,"
which is calculated as the number of years a country has waited to serve on the UNSC divided by the number of countries currently eligible for election. 16 If the turn-taking norm holds, this variable should be positively correlated with election.
Thus, we consider five broad perspectives: (i) a commitment to peace, (ii) a foreign aid story, (iii) a realist international relations perspective, (iv) a cultural approach, and (v) a turn-taking norm. Table 2 summarizes our hypotheses and the variables we use to test them along with their sources.
Econometric Model and Methodology

Preliminaries
Let the set of members of the UNGA in year t be decomposed into the set of member countries with permanent member status (PM) and the set of all other "ordinary" member countries. Let J = { } AF,AS,EE,GRULAC,WEOG be the set of caucusing groups (regions), and let the set of ordinary member countries belonging to region j in year t be denoted R jt , where t ∈ {0,…,T}. Let R j = ∪ t R jt denote the set of all past and present members of caucusing group j, and let C ij be the i th country within R j . The set of ordinary member countries belonging to a caucusing group in year t (a necessary condition to serve as a NPM in year t + 1) is therefore R t = ∪ j R jt .
Let NPM t denote the set of NPMs on the UNSC in year t, then the UNSC in a given year, t, is defined by
It is helpful to partition R t to reflect different categories of eligibility. In any given year a set of ordinary member countries -NPMs in the first year of their terms -gain automatic membership of the UNSC in the following year (A t ):
A second set of ordinary member countries, those that are in the final year of their term on the UNSC, are ineligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (I t ):
The remaining ordinary member countries are eligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (E t ):
since C ij was last elected to the UNSC (or since it entered the UN, if no such instance), t, ̄ denote the mean of t i and η denote the number of countries, excluding C ij , eligible for election. The measures we considered were: (1) 
Preferences
Denote the utility to the members of region j from electing country i in period t to the UNSC (to serve in periods t + 1 and t + 2) as u ijt = β j x ijt , where x ijt contains the characteristics of C ij in year t and β j contains the preference weights of region j. Similarly, denote by u GA , it = β GA x ijt the utility to the members of the UNGA of electing country i in period t.
Election to the UNSC can be conceived as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the regional groups make nominations, resulting in the Chairman of each region announcing to the UNGA a set of candidate countries N jt ⊆ E jt for election to the UNSC. In the second stage, the UNGA votes. As discussed in Section 2, because members of the UNGA almost always choose to vote for members of N jt , the vote in the second-stage can be viewed as taking place over these countries only.
One approach to estimation is to model this two-stage process explicitly. The resulting likelihood function is complex, however, and often fails to converge in estimations that include more than a few variables. We therefore employ a simpler representation that builds directly on the observation that election to the UNSC involves the interplay of two separate sets of preferences: those of the caucusing group (which shape the nominations) and those of the UNGA (which votes over nominated candidates). We therefore model UNSC election as arising from a composite latent utility function, U, of electing C ij at time t, given by
which is a weighted average of the underlying regional and UNGA preferences, plus a stochastic component ε ijt . 
Election Probabilities
We view the elections to the UNSC as choosing, for each region, n jt ∈ {0,1,2} countries from the set of eligible countries according to the utility function U ijt , where n jt = |NPM jt | -|A jt |.
This setting extends the well-known choice model of McFadden (1973) in two important respects. First, the set of alternatives is time varying. This occurs because (i) countries move between the sets (A jt ,E jt ,I jt ) from year-to-year as a result of the realizations of d ijt ; and (ii) entry and exit from R t , principally as new members join the UN and others leave.
19 Second, the number of members to be chosen from E jt is also time-variant, and need not be unity.
The tractability of McFadden's model is lost when, as in the UNSC, more than a single alternative is chosen simultaneously. To retain tractability, we therefore model election by the UNGA as a sequential process, in which countries are elected one-by-one. This methodology develops that of Manski and Sherman (1980) , who use a multiple-discrete choice model to examine household car purchases. Whereas a family may buy two of the same car, however, a country cannot have dual membership of the UNSC in any year, so we must explicitly rule out this possibility. Formally, in each of n jt rounds, there is a new realization of ε and a single country from E jt is elected according to utility maximization (
In the case when n jt = 2, if the same country is elected in both rounds, the result is annulled and the whole process repeated until two distinct countries are selected. 18 We compute α jt using Costa Rica (2005) , which contains full UNGA voting records for all UNSC elections prior to 2004. Voting records for 2004 onwards are taken directly from the relevant UNGA minutes. Costa Rica (2005) does not explicitly identify the "Chairman's list" countries. In the overwhelming majority of elections the patterns of voting in the UNGA clearly identify the "Chairman's list" countries (who garner large numbers of votes) from countries who are merely recipients of votes cast in protest or error (who garner only one or two votes). In a small number of cases the voting patterns identify the "Chairman's list" countries less clearly, as a country garners an intermediate number of votes between five and fifteen. In these cases we identify the set of "Chairman's list" countries as those that received ten or more votes. Our main results are, however, robust to any choice of threshold between three and twenty votes. 19 In the sample period 69 countries joined the UN, and five (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yemen Arab Republic, West Germany and Yugoslavia) left. 5 East Germany was a UNGA member in the EE group and West Germany a member in the WEOG. Effective from 1990 they were represented as a single member in the WEOG. 6 Although only gaining full independence in 1991, Ukraine and Belarus were founding members of the UN, having separate membership from the USSR. According to Nogee (2004) , this arrangement was agreed between the UK, USA and USSR at the Yalta Convention in 1945, so as to give the USSR three votes in the UNGA. 7 Israel joined the UN in 1949 but only became a temporary member of the WEOG, and thus eligible for election to the UNSC, in 2000.
If we assume, following Manski and Sherman (1980) , that the ε ijt in equation (1) 
When only one seat is contested in a region, the distributional assumptions on ε ijt imply that the probability in equation (5) of a single country being elected to the UNSC from E jt follows the conditional logit form. 21 We then use p ijt , 1 to form equation (6) as the binomial probability of observing a distinct country pair containing C ij , where the denominator corrects for the impossibility of a single country obtaining dual membership. Note that, by construction, ∑ k∈Ejt p ijt , njt = n jt . Equations (2)-(4) require no further explanation.
Using equations (1)- (6) Elections are not independent across time, however. Each year's election depends on the outcome of the previous year's election in a recursive manner, owing to the evolution of E t . 21 Although these distributional assumptions are strong, we note their necessity for retaining the conditional logit form. Also, when estimating the final likelihood in equation (7), we can allow for the possibility of withingroup clustering. Because we model the probability of choosing C ij in year t as conditional on the number of eligible countries in year t, our model, like the original conditional logit, implicitly addresses fixed effects for year. For an approach that relaxes our distributional assumptions at some conceptual and computational cost see Hendel (1999). where L jt , 2 uses the relevant multinomial distribution to compute the joint probability of having observed a given country pair. The likelihood function for having observed { }
Imputation
The Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of our data. While each individual variable is well-populated, when taken together as a group, a significant number of countryyears have observations missing for at least one variable (2,396 of 5,342). Dropping incomplete country-years is problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoretical perspective, as the probability of election in equations (5,6) are functions of the characteristics of every member of the eligible set, artificially excluding a country-year biases the estimates for the remaining countries in that year. From a practical perspective, the sample size becomes unduly small for some regions, thereby leading to a failure of model convergence.
We therefore employ multiple imputation techniques (ten imputations). 22 Of the variables that contain missing values, those that are continuous are each imputed using a truncated regression (to reflect, e.g., non-negativity constraints) that includes as independent variables all those that are fully observed. IMF program participation (the only binary variable to have missing observations) is similarly imputed, but with a logistic regression. In the large majority of cases we need only impute at most one observation per country-year, so only a small proportion (around 6 percent) of the data points that enter the regression analysis are imputed.
Preference change
Preferences, both regional and global, may change over time. In particular, Kim and Russett (1996) 
Country-specific effects
We would like to control for country-specific effects, as outlying countries that exhibit an idiosyncratic effect might drive some results, and obscure others. A complication is that a country-specific effect, if present at all, may exist at either the regional or global (UNGA)
level, or at both levels. We therefore test separately for country-specific effects at the regional and global levels.
To allow for a regional and a global country-specific effect for each of the 190 countries (past and present) in the set R j , a priori, requires the inclusion of 380 country indicator variables, which exhausts the degrees of freedom for certain regions in the earlier years, and prevents estimation of the model. Instead, we test for these effects. To test for a regional countryspecific effect, the likelihood of a model that includes both a country indicator in the appropriate region and in the UNGA (the encompassing model) is compared to the likelihood of a model that includes a country indicator only in the UNGA (the nested model). We employ the likelihood ratio test of Meng and Rubin (1992) , which allows for multiply imputed data. This test is performed for each country individually at the ten percent significance level. To further test for a global country-specific effect we repeat the above procedure, but the nested model instead excludes the country indicator in the UNGA.
It is possible, however, that the regional and global country-specific effects are individually insignificant, but jointly significant, or are individually significant, but jointly insignificant.
To test for these cases, we further compare the likelihood of the encompassing model with a nested model that excludes the country indicator in both the relevant region and the UNGA. 
za/). G77 and NAM
Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and NAM, 0 otherwise. EU Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of EU, 0 otherwise (http://www.europa.eu/). NATO Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NATO, 0 otherwise (http://www.nato.int/).
Do governments follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace?
Civil war Indicator coded 1 if a country is engaged in a civil war, 0 otherwise (Fearon et al., 2007) .
International war
Indicator coded 1 if a country is engaged in an international war, 0 otherwise (Ghosn et al., 2004) . Peacekeeping troops (log) Log (plus 1) of the average monthly military manpower supplied to UN peacekeeping operations per year (Heldt, 2008) .
Democracy indicator
Indicator coded 1 if contested elections fill the executive and legislative branches of government, 0 otherwise (Cheibub et al., 2010) .
Control of corruption
Score indicating perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (Kaufmann et al., 2011) .
Do shared cultural traits play a role? % Muslim
Muslims as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski et al., 2000) . % Catholic
Catholics as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski et al., 2000) .
Shared regional ideology
Proportion of the chief executives in the region sharing the same political ideology -left, center, right (Beck et al., 1999) . Former British colony Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former British colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski et al., 2000) . Former French colony Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former French colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski et al., 2000) .
Controls
Arab seat Indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the Arab swing seat (coded 1 for Arab countries in Africa every fourth year beginning 1972; 1 for Arab countries in Asia every fourth year beginning 1970; 0 otherwise). ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 Turn-taking norm 
Results
We present two sets of results. The first set (Table 3a) comes from estimating the likelihood function in equation (7) for UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005, using the full set of controls we consider. We drop explanatory variables from groups where, in the case of continuous variables, they exhibit no within-group variance, or in the case of indicator variables, where they are active for fewer than three countries in a group, and therefore become difficult to distinguish from a country-specific effect. To match the timing of the election process, we lag the independent variables by one year relative to UNSC membership.
We report robust standard errors, adjusted for the imputed data, and clustered on region × year, thereby allowing for within-region and within-year correlation, respectively, and heteroskedasticity. We control for the operation of the Arab swing seat by the inclusion of an indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the seat in a given year (see Table 2 ).
Different model specifications arise according to whether preference shifts are tested for before or after testing for country-specific effects. We therefore perform these two tests iteratively until an "equilibrium" model is reached in which the identified preference shifts are consistent with the identified country-specific effects, and the reverse also holds.
The method described in Section 4.6 allows a regional country-specific effect for 28 countries, and a global country-specific effect for 15 countries. 24 We include indicator variables for these countries in the full model of Table 3a , though, for reasons of space, we do not report their effects in the Table. 25 Among the countries our method identifies as a possible outlier is Nigeria, an African country known to have succeeded with an overt policy of queue-jumping (Security Council Report, 2009: 6) . Saudi Arabia and Panama are also identified, which is consistent with Schwartzberg (2003) and Zacher (2004) , who highlight that Saudi Arabia has never served on the UNSC, or even gained a regional nomination, while Panama has been a member of UNSC unusually often -it served three terms on the UNSC in the sample period (only Brazil and Argentina served more). Last, Mexico is also identified: participation in the UNSC elections of 2001 marked the end of two decades in which it had adopted a policy of not seeking election to the UNSC (Malone, 2000 : note 7).
26 Table 3b presents the results from a reduced model obtained from the findings in Table 3a .
We employ a general-to-specific algorithm that, at each iteration, removes the variable with the lowest t-statistic from the model, until all remaining variables are statistically significant at the ten percent level. The reduced model retains 33 of the 43 country-specific effects allowed for in the full model.
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Before discussing the results, we stress special caution in interpreting the results for Eastern
Europe and the UNGA because of the limited number of observations that they include. The EE group contains the fewest countries and the most imputed data, while only 35 out of the 180 elections in our sample are contested in the UNGA.
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Turning to the results, we hypothesize above that a country's commitment to peace should influence UNSC membership because of the explicit guidelines in the UN Charter. We find evidence to support this conjecture, albeit in somewhat different guises in each region. Clear evidence of a commitment to peace comes from the international war indicator included in Africa, Asia and the UNGA. Table 3b shows that, for Africa and Asia, involvement in an international conflict significantly reduces a country's chances of sitting on the UNSC, and that this effect is statistically significant at the one percent confidence level. The implied marginal effects of the model in Table 3a suggest, for instance, that participation in an international war reduces the probability of election by around 0.01 in Africa -during-Cold
War. 29 This may seem small, but recall that the average election probability in Africa is only 26 For more on the Mexican case, see, for example, Serrano and Kenny (2006: 298-314) . We are grateful to Diego Dewar for this suggestion. 27 The regional country-specific effects retained in the reduced model are (by region), Africa: Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Asia: India, Japan, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia; the GRULAC: Costa Rica, Panama; the WEOG: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland. It retains a global country-specific effect for Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Madagascar, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Slovakia, and West Germany. The results for these are available in the replication materials. 28 The estimates for the UNGA in Tables 3a-b seem of a different order of magnitude compared to the estimates for the regional groups. This can be explained with reference to equation (1), which weights UNGA preferences by α jt , and group preferences by (1 -α jt ) in the composite utility function. Even for election years with non-zero values of α jt , its value is typically close to zero; E(α jt | α jt ≠ 0) = 0.038, so the apparently large UNGA effects we estimate are offset by the very low weight UNGA preferences receive in the composite preference. 29 We calculate elasticity and marginal effect estimates for 2006, the final year of our sample, using equation (5). We evaluate these using the mi predict command in Stata 12, at the group-specific means x,¯j t . Different estimates apply to "clean slate" and "contested" elections. The former are evaluated at α jt = 0, and the latter at
We find negligible differences between these estimates, however, so we do not report each separately. Estimates also vary according to n jt : we report estimates for n jt = 1, but in group-years with n jt = 2, a different estimate based on equation (6) does apply in practice. Last, the estimates vary across years due to the 3/53 ≈ 0.06. Hence, involvement in international conflict cuts this probability by around onesixth. This effect, however, seems to have changed over time. In Africa, involvement in international war ceases to influence UNSC election after the Cold War. In Asia, we see the opposite effect: Table 3b shows that the distaste for war has developed more recently. Both sets of results indicate that the norm against choosing countries at war exists not only in the regions but also in the UNGA -throughout both time periods.
Domestic conflict also impacts a country's chances of election. Table 3b shows that in Africa, Asia, and EE, ongoing civil unrest decreases a country's chances of receiving a regional nomination. These findings continue to hold in the presence of the full set of controls in Table 3a . Interestingly, however, the UNGA does not appear to shun countries in civil war.
To the contrary, during the sample period it three times elected such countries in contested elections: Nicaragua in 1982, Peru in 1983, and Rwanda in 1993. These cases help to constitute a statistically significant positive effect of civil war for the UNGA decision.
We also detect a role for peacekeeping troop contributions, although not in every region.
Specifically, Table 3b shows that in Asia, the GRULAC and the WEOG, the more troops a country contributes, the more likely it is to gain UNSC membership. In Table 3b , the effect in Asia and in the WEOG is significant at the one percent level, but only at the 10 percent level in the GRULAC. A one percent increase in troop contributions produces a range of effects across regime from a 1.1 percent rise in election probability in WEOG, down to a 0.22 percent rise in the GRULAC. We find no evidence of a role for troop contributions in Africa or EE. The UNGA, if anything, also favors countries with higher troop contributions, but the effect is not statistically significant in Table 3a and is dropped from the model in Table 3b .
In the WEOG, both sets of results indicate that democratic countries were more likely to be elected in the Cold War era (all countries in the WEOG are coded as democratic in the postCold War era). The only authoritarian regime ever elected to represent the WEOG was Spain in 1968. The dictatorships in Portugal and Greece never won election. Since democratizing, Spain has been elected three times, and Portugal and Greece have each been elected twice.
With respect to foreign aid, we find only weak evidence that it plays a role, and not always in a consistent direction. In both sets of results, IMF program participation plays a role only in Asia, where it is negatively associated with UNSC election. The IMF has become supremely unpopular in Asia since the East Asian Financial Crisis, so Asian support may genuinely evolution of the eligible set. We have evaluated the estimates for 2006 under different assumed eligibility conditions, and find this source of variation to be of minor proportions. decline for governments cooperating with the institution. Alternatively, IMF program participation might indicate political or economic weakness, reducing the incentives to apply, and the probability to receive, temporary UNSC membership. New World Bank projects are positively associated with receiving a regional nomination in Africa and Asia in both sets of results. Yet this result is not robust. For example, it does not hold for either region in specifications where we do not include indicator variables for country outliers. Nor does it hold when we do not include the Pariah state variable -or if we employ an alternative coding of the pariah state variable. Moreover, Table 3b shows that countries with more newly approved World Bank projects are actually less likely to be elected by the UNGA. This latter finding disappears in the presence of additional controls in Table 3a , however. US grants and loans play a role only in Africa (Table 3b) , where both associate negatively with UNSC election.
Of interest, more heavily indebted countries are more likely to be elected in Africa and the GRULAC. As debt service contains the most imputed values of our variables, it is sensible to be cautious in interpreting these results. Indeed, the result for Africa holds only in the reduced specification (Table 3b) , not in the presence of the control variables. Still, given the turn-taking norm in these regions, governments may have a good idea of when they will get their chance to serve on the UNSC, and thus pursue lax macroeconomic policies in anticipation of the windfall in foreign aid that UNSC membership brings.
Turning to the role of international power, the statistical significance of one of our measures holds across all regions: the more populous a country, the more likely it is to take a seat on the UNSC. In Table 3b the statistical significance of the effect holds at least at the five percent level in all five regional groups (although only during the post-Cold War period for EE and the GRULAC). The coefficient estimates in Table 3b imply that a one percent increase in population generates an increase in election probability of between 0.51 percent (Africa) and 3.9 percent (Asia during Cold War). The population effect weakens somewhat in the presence of additional controls in Table 3a , and disappears entirely in EE. The additional controls in Table 3a , however, do not have effects robust to the reduction algorithm we employ. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the UNGA takes population into account in its voting decisions.
In light of the significance of population, one might expect the statistical significance of a country's level of economic development. Only in Asia and the GRULAC, however, do we see a robust effect (significant at the one percent confidence level in Table 3b ): richer countries in these regions are more likely to gain representation on the UNSC. Larger countries are more likely to obtain a regional nomination in Africa and the GRULAC in Table 3b , but a weak result to the reverse holds in the WEOG. The UNGA does not appear to take territorial size into account in its election decisions.
As for political connections to powerful countries, we see evidence in both sets of results for the WEOG that countries voting with the United States in the UNGA may actually be less likely to gain group nomination. A further finding for WEOG, though only in Table 3b , is that voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is also associated with a lower probability of election. In contrast, voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is associated with a higher probability of election in Africa and the GRULAC. Interestingly, in Table 3b , voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is associated with a large positive effect in the UNGA, significant at the one percent level. The finding suggests a strong Soviet influence within the UNGA. The finding fails to hold in the presence of further controls in Table 3a .
The "Pariah state" indicator for countries subject to US and/or UN sanctions shows evidence of a change in preferences over time. During the Cold War, sanctioned countries were largely unable to obtain a regional nomination, as indicated by the strong negative findings in Africa, Asia and the GRULAC in both sets of results. Since the Cold War, however, Table 3b indicates that sanctions do not predict UNSC election. We also investigate whether membership in particular political groupings influences election to the UNSC. We find evidence that such membership matters in some regions and in the UNGA, although the effects go in different directions. In Table 3b , we see that membership in the G77 -but not in the NAM -has a negative effect in Asia, but a positive effect in the GRULAC. In the GRULAC dual membership in NAM and G77 also positively predicts regional nomination in Table 3b . Such dual membership is negatively associated, however, with the probability of winning a contested vote in the UNGA. Table 3a , and it is, unsurprisingly, dropped from the model in Table 3b . Membership in JUSCANZ is unrelated to the regional nomination process in the WEOG in Table 3b , but does appear to positively influence the UNGA. As for groupings external to the UN, EU membership appears to raise a country's probability of receiving a regional nomination, both for those EU members in EE, and for those in the WEOG. NATO membership, however, has no effect on regional nomination probability for members of the WEOG, but a pronounced negative effect for members of EE.
The UNGA, however, shows no preference for membership in these groupings.
Do cultural traits of a country influence its election prospects? In both sets of results we find evidence that countries with a history of British colonialism experience a greater probability of election in Asia and the GRULAC, but the effect does not hold for Africa, the WEOG, or the UNGA. We test for an effect of French colonial heritage in Africa and the UNGA. We 30 A common political ideology is seen in Table 3b to be associated with an increased probability of election for EE and GRULAC. The finding survives the presence of further controls for the GRULAC but not for EE. We find no evidence of an effect of shared political ideology for the UNGA, which contrasts with Potrafke's (2009) finding that government ideology affects a country's UNGA voting behavior.
We also consider religion, in particular the proportion of the country's population that is The second finding, present only in Table 3a and robust to reduction, is that in the WEOG Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to the UNSC. Here the effect appears driven by one country, Turkey, which never won election to the UNSC during the sample period, but served three earlier terms representing Asia and one subsequent term representing the WEOG. The final finding, present only in Table 3b , is that Muslim countries are less likely to be selected to represent EE. Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia are the only countries in EE coded as having a significant Muslim population; none of them have ever won election to the UNSC. As for the Catholic variable, a higher proportion of
Catholics among the population is associated with a lower probability of election in Asiabut no other region (the finding holds in both Tables 3a and 3b ).
The regions appear to have heterogeneous preferences over corruption. In Table 3b we find no role for corruption in Africa, Asia, or EE. In the GRULAC, however, corruption pays: we find a negative effect on a country's chances of becoming a UNSC member (significant at the ten percent level in Table 3b ). On the other hand, corruption does not pay in the WEOG, where control of corruption is positively associated with UNSC election in Table 3b . The relationship of the UNGA with corrupt countries appears to have changed over time. During the Cold War, the UNGA appears to have been susceptible to choosing corrupt countries:
control of corruption associates negatively with UNSC election by the UNGA. In the postCold War period, however, Table 3b indicates that the UNGA has tended to shun more corrupt countries.
Finally, we find widespread evidence of the operation of a turn-taking norm -not only in Africa: the longer a country has been waiting to appear on the Council the higher the probability of receiving the endorsement of the regional caucus. Table 3a shows the importance of the effect at the five percent significance level or stronger in the presence of our control variables and Table 3b shows the significance level strengthens to the one percent confidence level in the reduced model. The estimates in Table 3b imply a range of substantive effects across regions: a one percent increase in waiting time increases election probability by 8.2 percent in Asia and 6.1 percent in the WEOG (post-Cold War), down to an increase of just 1.6 percent in EE. The common misperception that membership on the UNSC rotates therefore finds some support in the electoral patterns at the regional level. As might be expected, the UNGA does not appear influenced by the turn-taking rights that apply within the regions.
Conclusion
The Security Council is the preeminent organ of the United Nations. Membership confers significant international influence and also economic benefits. We set out to consider the characteristics of countries toward which the UNSC election process diverts these economic benefits towards. To that end, we considered five different perspectives as to the determinants of election to the UNSC.
As candidature decisions at the regional level follow no codified rules (with the exception of Africa), and governments keep their negotiations behind closed doors, many factors likely remain unobserved. It is thus appropriate to treat our results with caution. Nevertheless, if election to the UNSC were entirely random, we would not expect the types of systematic relationships we report in Section 5.
Our results suggest that the regional nomination process tends to allocate membership, and its associated economic benefits, according to a compromise between a norm to elect more populous countries and a norm for each country to receive a turn. Mediating this central compromise are a norm against nominating countries involved in civil or international war (as prescribed by the UN Charter) and norm in favor of countries that contribute more personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (in Africa, Asia, and the WEOG). During the Cold War, the regions of Africa, Asia, and the GRULAC may have followed a norm against nominating pariah countries whose presence on the UNSC would have upset one or more of the permanent members. If so, the norm seems to have weakened or disappeared in the postCold War era.
The UNGA has the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the UNSC election process rather infrequently. When it has a say, it reinforces the regional nomination norms of directing membership away from countries involved in international conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the UNGA has also systematically directed membership away from countries perceived as having high levels of corruption. In contrast to the regional groups, however, the UNGA decisions do not appear influenced by regional turn-taking norms or by the size of a country's population.
Perhaps surprisingly, after controlling for other influences, we find little evidence that the level of economic development influences election probability. There is also a lack of consistent evidence for a role of foreign aid, and only occasional evidence for cultural influences.
These findings speak to a number of literatures. For instance, our findings that the GRULAC tends to select countries that fail to control corruption, while the UNGA has shifted away from electing such countries, informs the debate over whether corrupt governments receive more or less foreign aid (e.g., Alesina and Weder, 2002) . Our finding that countries involved in civil or international conflict sacrifice foreign aid through fewer appearances on the UNSC suggests an additional cost of conflict that is yet to be considered in the literature that seeks to measure such costs (e.g., Bozzoli et al., 2011) . Last, our finding that preferences over election to the UNSC exhibit heterogeneity across regions may prove useful, as a case study, to scholars interested in the evolution of norms (e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 1994; Bendor, 2001 ). Because Security Council participation is consequential for different types of foreign aid, a heterogeneous election process implies that UNSC membership may serve as an instrument that such scholars can use as a measure of international political importance.
UNSC membership should prove most useful if population size and the turn-taking norm are exogenous to the outcome variable of interest.
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As no published empirical analysis of the determinants of UNSC election currently exists, we note that our study represents a first step and offer the following suggestions for future research. As an extension to our analysis, researchers may seek to augment country-level data with personal-level data on UN Ambassadors. Malone (2000) , citing Dutch officials, notes that up to a quarter of UN representatives vote without instructions from their capitals. The personal characteristics and interactions of the individuals on the New York scene may therefore play a role in some elections. While we suspect that this avenue of research would prove fruitful, we note that it would involve intensive and detailed data collection.
As for reform of the UNSC, we propose considering what currently determines representation: Election depends partly on a random draw of idiosyncratic factors, partly on how populous a country is, and partly on a norm of giving everyone a turn. Those who feel that big, powerful countries should serve on the UNSC more often -perhaps because they play a crucial role in global politics -should try to undermine the regional nomination 31 We stress here that turn-taking is likely an exogenous source of variation that scholars can use, and it has a statistically significant effect for the 81 percent of the sample, where regions make the decision. Turn-taking, however, does not hold for the UNGA, so scholars may wish to flag the contested elections (19 percent of the sample) as factors such as corruption, international war, and voting with the Soviet Union/Russia appear to play a role. See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Dreher et al. (forthcoming) for recent studies using UNSC membership as an instrument.
process and push for more contested elections at the UNGA level. After all, we find no evidence of a turn-taking norm when the UNGA decides contested elections. Allowing for reelection, for example, would enable big countries to run for election more often.
Other reformers, who may feel that every country should have its turn on the world stage, should favor endowing the regional groups with the power to elect their own representatives.
For, all of the regions follow the turn-taking norm to some extent. Alternatively, one could ensure turn-taking if election relied on an actual rotation across all UN members. We suspect that interests on both sides -in favor of large countries and in favor of taking turnscounterbalance each other so that the status quo is likely to prevail. * UNGA statistics are reported for elections that involve a contested vote in the UNGA.
Appendix: Descriptive Statistics (by region)
